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Experimenting with Behavior Based Pricing

Abstract

Many purchases of differentiated goods are repeated, giving sellers the opportunity to engage in
price discrimination based upon the shopper’s previous behavior by either offering loyalty
discounts to repeat buyers or introductory rates to new customers. Recent theoretical work
suggests that loyalty discounts are likely to be implemented when customer preferences are not
stationary and sellers can pre-commit to prices for repeat buyers, but otherwise repeat buyers can
be expected to pay the same or more than new buyers. This paper reports the results of a series
of controlled laboratory experiments designed to empirically test the impact of these factors on
pricing strategies, seller profit and total cost to consumers. Absent price pre-commitments,
sellers in the lab engage in poaching when it is optimal to do so, but the ability to pre-commit
leads to prices being relatively more favorable to loyal customers. Customer poaching increases
seller profit and increases total consumer costs in the case of stable consumer preferences
without price pre-commitment.
Keywords: Loyalty Discounts, Poaching, Repeat Purchases, Price Discrimination
JEL codes: C71, C91, D41
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Introduction
Sellers have long engaged in various forms of price discrimination (see Stole, 2007; Varian,
1989). However, recent technological advances give sellers even more information about their
customers including the ability to track people across shopping episodes. This enables sellers,
both online and in bricks and mortar stores, to identify which customers are making a repeat visit
and which are new. With such information sellers can either attempt to reward loyalty or poach
from rivals. Indeed, both practices are now commonly observed. Many airlines and retailers
offer perks to loyal customers, while credit cards and insurance companies commonly advertise
low introductory rates to new customers. In each of these cases sellers are basing prices on the
shopper’s previous behavior.
Caillaud and De Nijs (2011, p. 1) define the practice of “offering different prices to different
customers according to their past purchase history” as behavior based pricing (BBP). This
practice, which does not fit any of the traditional categories of price dissemination, has also been
referred to as customer relationship management based pricing (Shih and Sudhir, 2007), pricing
with customer recognition (Esteves, 2010a, 2010b; Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000; Villas-Boas,
1999; Villas-Boas, 2004) or one-to-one pricing (Rossi et al., 1996; Shaffer and Zhang, 1997).
Given the popularity of both practices, there have been several recent theoretical papers that
attempted to understand the market conditions that determine when loyalty rewards are optimal
and when poaching is optimal (e.g. Caminal and Clarici, 2007; Caminal and Matutes, 1990;
Chen, 1997; Chen and Pearcy, 2010; Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000; Pazgal and Soberman, 2008;
Villas-Boas, 1999; Shin and Sudhir, 2007, 2010).2
While the optimality of poaching or loyalty discounts depends on the assumptions of the specific
model, generally poaching is found to be optimal. The general reasoning is that initial purchases
help sellers identify the customers who value their product most and thus can be exploited later;
that is the first period is used to segment the market. For example, Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)
2

Based on the empirical analysis of Swedish newspaper subscriptions, Asplund, Eriksson and Strnad
(2008) report that in competitive markets, the use of discounts to poach is inversely related to the seller’s
market share. There has also been work in monopoly settings considering pricing to new and repeat
customers (e.g. Acquisti and Varian, 2005; Bikhchandani and McCardle, 2012; Villas-Boas, 2004).
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use a simple two firm, two period Hotelling model where there is a continuum of relative brand
preferences by customers. When customers’ preferences do not change over time, the second
period is essentially competition over two distinct markets, one for customers who prefer the
seller and one for customers who prefer the rival. To capture the rival’s customers, the seller
must offer a low poaching price. However, Caminal and Matutes (1990) find that under the
conditions of independent customer preferences and price pre-commitment for loyal customers,
it can be more profitable for sellers to reward their own high-valued customers. Similar results
are obtained by Shin and Sudhir (2007, 2010), who studied a market with high and low quantity
demanded customers (see also Shaffer and Zhang, 2000).
In a recent paper, Chen and Pearcy (2010) develop a model that captures several key pieces of
the behavior based pricing problem. They also consider a basic two period duopoly Hotelling
model and show that the optimality of rewarding loyalty versus poaching depends on 1) the
ability to pre-commit to future prices for repeat customers and 2) the degree to which buyer
preferences vary between periods. In particular, Chen and Pearcy (2010) show that regardless of
the ability to pre-commit to future prices, a lack of heterogeneity across time should lead to
poaching. However, when there is heterogeneity in preferences over time and sellers can
guarantee a future price to repeat buyers then loyalty is rewarded. The logic is that the low
future price induces people to visit the seller initially and attract back those who may ultimately
find themselves preferring the competitor in the future without having to offer low prices to
those who do not visit initially but change to preferring that seller in the future. If there is
sufficient heterogeneity and an inability to commit to future prices then the market essentially
becomes a repeated single period Hotelling game as in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000).
While sellers routinely have to make the decision to poach or offer loyalty discounts, it can be
difficult to study such markets empirically, because customer preferences and “distance costs”
are inherently unobservable. Therefore, we turn to controlled laboratory experiments to
empirically explore how the factors identified by Caminal and Matutes (1990), Chen and Pearcy
(2010), and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) among others impact behavior based pricing. Our
paper reports the results of a series of market experiments, which vary the degree of
heterogeneity in shopper preferences between periods and the ability of sellers to pre-commit to
3

prices for loyal customers. Of course, naturally occurring markets have a myriad of other
complicating factors such as more than two sellers being in operation, buyers making decisions
over more than two periods, people entering and exiting the market asynchronously, etc. The
goal in developing a theoretical model or an experiment is to focus on the interplay of the key
elements. Thus controlled laboratory experiments are an ideal tool for cleanly examining seller
reactions to factors the model has identified as strategically important.
Despite the recent theoretical work on behavior based pricing, the only related laboratory
experiments of which we are aware are by Mahmood (2011) and Mahmood and Vulkan (2012),
both of which are in the vein of Shin and Sudhir (2010) and in settings where loyalty discounts
are not expected. Mahmood (2011) considers a discrete version of a high and low volume
customer environment and allows for preference mobility.3 Behaviorally, Mahmood (2011) does
not observe loyalty discounts in any of the treatments and does observe poaching with customer
recognition as anticipated. Mahmood and Vulkan (2012) conduct an experiment with
professionals from a variety of industries. These experiments also involved high and low
volume customers and varied the market structure (two firms on a Hotelling line or four firms on
a Sallop circle) and the ability to price discriminate based on type. Their results suggest that
greater competition reduces the magnitude of poaching and can encourage loyalty discounts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section lays out the theoretical
framework for the markets examined in the lab. The experimental design and the experimental
results are then presented in separate sections. A final section offers conducing remarks.

Market Structure
Our market structure follows that of Chen and Pearcy (2010). There are two firms

∈

,

selling differentiated products a la a linear Hotelling model. For simplicity, we use the notation

3

The environment is discrete in that there are only a few buyers who make purchase decisions rather than a
continuum as in the theoretical model. This is due to the use of human subjects as buyers in those experiments. It is
possible that equilibria differ between the continuous and discrete cases, but it is not clear which is more informative
as to behavior in any particular naturally occurring market.
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– to denote ’s rival. Firms sell their products in two periods, n=1, 2. Customers demand one
unit in the first period and one unit in the second period. Each period, customers are distributed
uniformly over an interval of length ̅ . Firm A is located at 0 while Firm B is located at ̅ . In
period n, a customer located at

receives a utility of v - pA -

for purchasing from A at price pA

and receives a utility of v - pB - ( ̅ - ) from buying from B at price pB. v is assumed to be
sufficiently high that all buyers will purchase a unit in both periods. Total consumer cost in
period n are denoted by Cn and include the price paid to a seller plus travel costs. In period 2,
Firm f can identify customers who visited Firm f in period 1. Therefore, each firm sets three
prices:

is Firm f’s price in period 1,

customers, and

is Firm f’s price in period 2 for repeat (loyal)

is Firm f’s price in period 2 for new customers. Sellers incur a constant

marginal cost, c, for each unit sold.
With this basic framework, we consider the implications of two factors. The first is the
relationship between buyer preferences in period 1 and period 2. Although Chen and Pearcy
(2010) allow for a continuum of relationships, we focus on the two extreme cases: buyer
preferences are independently determined each period and buyer preferences are fixed over
time.4 The second is the timing of when

is set: before or after buyers make their period 1

decisions. That is, whether or not sellers pre-commit to loyalty prices. Other prices are always
set at the start of the period for which the price is in effect. The combinations of the two factors
yield four distinct cases. A firm is said to poach if

>

and offer a loyalty discount if the

inequality is reversed. Given the sequential nature of the market, the appropriate solution
concept is that of subgame perfection. While Chen and Pearcy (2010) characterize the
equilibrium, for our purposes it is also critical to identify the best response functions for both
sellers in period 2 and buyers in period 1 in case observed first period seller behavior is off the
equilibrium path. Buyers in period 2 will simply choose to purchase from the seller offering the
lower total cost at that point.

4

Chen and Pearcy (2010) model the preference relationship between periods using a copula with a continuous
parameter α. Our cases correspond to theirs for α =0 and α =1.
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Case 1: Independent Preferences and No Price Commitment
In this case, buyers are randomly relocated after the first period. Therefore, in period 2 the
sellers are essentially competing on two independent Hotelling lines of length ̅ . The line for
people who purchased from A in period 1 accounts for a fraction

∗

of the total market and the

remainder are uniformly distributed over the other line. Hence, the second period profit
maximization problem for Firm A is to
max

∗

1

,

∗

where R and S denote the location of the customers who did and did not visit Firm A in period 1,
respectively, and who are now indifferent between the two firms in period 2 given the relevant
period 2 prices. For concreteness,
≡

≡

Firm B has a similar objective function. The first order conditions yield the following period 2
best response conditions:
and

.

From these conditions it is straight forward to show that in equilibrium
c

θ.

(1)

In period 1, customers will decide where to shop based on the observed period 1 prices and the
prices they expect to observe in period 2. θ∗ can be identified by equating the expected utility of
visiting Firm A in period 1 with the expected utility of visiting Firm B in period 1. That is

∗

is

such that
̅

∗

̅
which holds when

∗

̅

̅

∗

̅

̅
̅

=
∗

,

. The integration arises due to the fact that in period 1, the

customer does not know what her period 2 preferences will be. Given this, one can derive that
̅ . In this case, firms do not reward

the equilibrium first period prices are

loyalty or engage in poaching, making it an attractive baseline for comparing behavior across
treatments.
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Case 2: Constant Preferences and No Price Commitment
In this case, the buyers do not change their preferences between periods. Hence, in the second
period the sellers will be competing over two non-overlapping markets, one consisting of buyers
that are close to A and one consisting of buyers that are close to B. Each seller will end up
setting high price in period 2 to those known to prefer it and low poaching prices to buyers who
are known to prefer the rival.
Formally, the second period profit functions of the two firms are given by
∗

and
̅

∗

where R and S are defined as before. Simultaneously solving the four first order conditions
yields the optimal second period prices:
̅

∗

∗

̅

∗

Therefore after observing the period 1 prices

̅

4
3

∗

∗

∗

∗

̅
3

̅

∗

∗

,

. The optimal period 2 prices can thus be rewritten as
and

(2a)

.

(2b)

It is straight forward to show that the equilibrium prices are given by
and

.

is such that

̅

∗

which reduces to

∗

∗

,

, from which it is clear that new customers are being poached with a discount of
= . A second interesting feature of the equilibrium is that all second period prices

should be less than first period prices.
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,

,

The above analysis applies so long as
θ∗

θ

,

, which holds for θ∗ ∈

,

, firm 2 will only push its price for new customers down to cost, i.e.

firm 1 will respond by setting
2θ∗

θ

2θ∗

θ

c. Similarly, when θ∗

θ

,

θ

. When

, to which
then

and

c.5

θ

Case 3: Independent Preferences with Price Commitment
In this case, sellers will be competing over two independent lines in period 2, but they will have
already set their price for the line involving their repeat customers. Thus there is only one choice
variable for a firm in period 2, the price to charge new customers, which can be a function of the
rival’s price to repeat customers. The somewhat surprising result is that in this case sellers offer
lower prices to their repeat customers. The intuition is that a seller wants to guarantee a low
repeat price so as to attract customers in period 1, but in period 2 the seller finds it better to
exploit the new customers who are close by, rather than trying to compete with the rival’s low
loyalty price.
With independent preferences and repeat price commitment, the second period profit functions
for A and B are
∗

∗

∗

1

̅

∗

1

and
̅

.

The resulting optimal prices for new customers in period 2 are given by:
.
As in Case 1,

∗

(3)

is determined taking into account that the buyers do not know what their

preferences will be in period 2. The solution that
∗

̅
2

2

7
8

2

8 ̅

32 ̅

comes from equating
̅

∗

5

Empirically, there was a single instance for which θ∗ ∉

,
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with

in the experimental investigation of this case.

̅

̅

∗

Sellers of course take into account how their period 1 choices of

and

affect

,

resulting subgame perfect equilibrium prices are
The loyalty discount is the difference between

.
∗

. The

, and

and equals

.

̅ . It is also interesting to

note that the first period price and the second period price for new customers should be the same
in Cases 2 and 3. The only change in equilibrium behavior is the price charged to loyal
customers, which should now be below cost. Also as in Case 2, all period 2 prices are below
those in period 1.

Case 4: Constant Preferences with Price Commitment
Like Case 2, the sellers are competing over two distinct regions, but as in Case 3, each firm has a
single choice variable in period 2. Therefore, the second period profit functions are simpler than
those of Case 2. Specifically:
∗

̅

∗

The first order conditions give:
∗

As buyer preferences do not change,

̅
∗

.

can be found by setting
̅

∗

which yields

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗
∗

=

∗

,

. Therefore, the period 2 best responses can be written

as
.
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(4)

As a result, equilibrium prices are

̅

,

, and

. Here new

customers receive a discount of and as in Cases 2 and 3 all second period prices are expected to
be below first period prices.

Experimental Design
To explore BBP, we conducted a series of controlled laboratory experiments using a 2 × 2
design. Corresponding to the four cases modeled in the previous section, the first dimension was
the relationship of preferences between periods (fixed or independent) and the second dimension
was the ability to pre-commit to the price charged to repeat customers (not possible or possible).
The parameters preferences used in the experiment were ̅ = 120 and = 50. While these
parameters are somewhat arbitrary, they lead to clear separation in predicted prices. The
resulting price predictions are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Price Predictions
Case
Buyer Preferences
Price Pre-commitment

C

1-Baseline
Independent
No
170
170
170
14 400
48 000

2
Fixed
No
210
130
90
13 600
47 200

3
Independent
Yes
210
10
90
8 000
36 800

4
Fixed
Yes
170
110
80
12 750
40 350

In order to aide subject comprehension, the task was presented to subjects as a problem faced by
a pair of ice cream vendors located at opposite end of a beach on a crowded day. Each “day” in
the experiment a subject could set a morning price for everyone and separate afternoon prices for
repeat and new customers. As explained to the subjects, all of the buyers in the market were
computerized robots who determined their decisions based only on price and travel distance and
behaved optimally given the observed prices (that is

∗

, R, and S followed the derivations in the

previous section). For simplicity, each subject was presented the task as though she was firm A
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located at 0 and their rival was firm B located at ̅ =120. Figure 1 shows a sample image of the
subject screen in the baseline case.
Figure 1: Subject Decision Screen in Baseline Case

A session consisted of four subjects. To eliminate repeated play incentives, each “day” subjects
were randomly and anonymously rematched with someone else in their session. Treatment
effects are evaluated between subjects as each session involved only a single treatment case.
After entering the lab, subjects read printed instructions and completed a comprehension handout
(both available in the Appendix). Once everyone had completed the handout the experiment
began. The experiment lasted 20 “days” and the subjects were paid their cumulative earnings,
which were converted from the lab dollars used in the experiment to cash at the rate of 2500 Lab
Dollars = US$0.10. Subjects did not know in advance how many “days” the experiment would
last, but did know the exchange rate.
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The experiments were conducted in The Behavioral Business Research Laboratory at the
University of Arkansas. Multiple sessions in different treatments were conducted concurrently
so as to eliminate the effect of any uncontrolled nuisance variables and to further mask the
identity of one’s rival in any given period. The participants were drawn from the lab’s
participant database, which is comprised primarily of undergraduate students. None of the
subjects had participated in any related studies although some had participated in other unrelated
experiments. As is standard in the lab, subjects were paid a $5 participation payment for the
approximately one hour experiment in addition to their salient earnings, which averaged $16.25.

Experimental Results
The data consist of 3840 market pricing decisions from 16 sessions (four replications of each of
the four treatments).6 Aggregate behavior is displayed graphically in Figure 2 and summarized
in Table 2.
In the baseline case 1, where consumer preferences are independent over time and there is no
price pre-commitment, the price should be 170 in every situation. Figure 1 and Table 2 clearly
show that prices are lower than predicted. Where a buyer purchased in period 1 should have no
effect on prices in period 2, a result affirmed in Table 2 by the lack of significance for the Loyal
Customer Price Effect in column 1. However, prices should be the same in the afternoon and the
morning, a result which does not hold as afternoon prices are significantly lower as evidenced by
the significance of the Afternoon Price Effect in column 1.
In cases 2 and 4, where buyer preferences are fixed, the prediction is that afternoon prices are
lower than morning prices and that sellers engage in poaching. The regression results in Table 2
indicate that both patterns hold, significantly for Case 2 and at least nominally for Case 4.
However, in neither case the size of the loyalty discount is as large as it should be. The reason
for this differs between the two cases. In case 2, prices to new customers are not as low as they

6

The analysis of data was done on the whole dataset. The results remain qualitatively unchanged if the first ten
“days” are dropped.
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should be whereas in case 4, prices to loyal customers are not as high as they should be. For
both cases morning prices are lower than the predicted value.
Figure 2: Distribution of Prices

Note: Solid line represents prices predicted by model.

We now turn to case 3, where sellers are predicted to offer discounts to loyal customers because
buyer preferences vary over time and price pre-commit is available. As in the other cases,
morning prices are significantly too low (see Table 2). While sellers are offering nominally
higher prices to new customers, the difference is not statistically significant. The main driving
factor is that sellers are generally unwilling to commit to pricing below cost as required by the
model. From Figure 1, it is clear that although some sellers in this setting do price below cost,
the vast majority price above cost. Still, in the other three cases sellers essentially never price
below cost and rarely price close to cost. One possible explanation is that subjects exhibit loss
13

aversion. In addition, as shown in Table 1 this practice actually leads to much lower profits for
the sellers so they have an incentive to avoid it. Alternatively, subjects may consider pricing
below cost as socially inappropriate “predatory pricing” or an unfair trade practice (e.g. Bolton,
Brodley and Riordan, 2000; Petit and Neyrinck, 2010).
Table 2: Analysis of Prices by Case
Case
1-Baseline
2
Buyer Preferences
Independent
Fixed
Price Pre-commitment
No
No
Morning Price
Mean
141.5
138.2
Model
170
210
p-value
0.002
<0.001
Price for Loyal Customers
Mean
119.7
129.2
Model
170
130
p-value
<0.001
0.750
Price for New Customers
Mean
116.5
114.1
Model
170
90
p-value
<0.001
<0.001
Regression Results for Comparing Prices Within a Day
Afternoon Price Effect
-25.028**
-24.041***
(7.227)
(3.094)
Loyal Customer Price Effect
3.250
15.022**
(7.889)
(3.857)
Constant
141.512*** 138.172***
(9.363)
(1.306)
Observations
960
960

3
Independent
Yes

4
Fixed
Yes

133.3
210
<0.001

112.2
170
<0.001

99.6
10
<0.001

94.6
110
0.006

104.5
90
0.043

86.8
80
0.353

-28.800**
(8.735)
-4.919
(6.749)
133.319***
(13.114)
960

-25.412**
(5.881)
7.753
(4.933)
112.213***
(6.581)
960

Note: The afternoon price effect is the incremental change from morning prices that applies to both
and
relative to . Clustered standard error
whereas the Loyal Customer Price Effect is the incremental effect for
in parentheses. ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. For Cases 2, 3, and 4 with
directional predictions for the size of the loyalty discount, the appropriate 1-sided hypothesis is implemented.

At first pass, the reluctance of sellers to price below cost appears to call into question the
predictive success of the model for identifying when loyalty discounts will be observed.
However, further analysis reported in Table 3 shows that the intuition provided by the model
does correspond to observed behavior in that sellers were significantly more likely to offer
14

loyalty discounts in case 3. Specifically, Table 3, reports the results of a probit regression where
the dependent variable equals one if the seller offered any loyalty discount in a given day and is
zero if the seller engaged in poaching (or offered the same price to both groups). The estimation
in Table 3 includes case specific dummy variables. In addition to demonstrating that loyalty
discounts are more prevalent in case 3 as evidence by the positive and significant coefficient,
Table 3 also clearly indicates that poaching is more common in cases 2 and 4 exactly as
predicted. Together these results indicate a reasonable degree of success for the model in terms
of when poaching is likely to occur even if the magnitude is not as great as expected.
Table 3: Analysis of Sellers’ Willingness to Offer Loyalty Discount by Case
Variables
Coefficient

Constant
-0.311***
(0.114)
<0.001

p-value

Case 2
-0.541***
(0.106)
<0.001

Case 3
0.489**
(0.109)
0.021

Case 4
-0.250***
(0.076)
<0.001

Note: Dependent variable is binary and equals to 1 if loyalty is present and 0 if not, we did not take into account
situation where sellers offered the same price for new and repeated customers. Analysis is done on individual
decision level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level,
respectively.

All of the preceding analysis examines unconditional behavior. However, as shown in equations
(1)-(4), prices set in the afternoon should depend on prices set in the morning, except in the
baseline. From (3), for case 3




, so that as the rival’s price to loyal customers increases,

one’s own price to new customers should increase by a smaller amount. This means that the
optimal loyalty discount is shrinking as overall afternoon price levels increase. Thus, reluctance
by sellers to price below cost would lead to smaller loyalty discounts, exactly the pattern that we
observe. To explore this in more detail, we conducted regression analysis of afternoon prices as
a function of the prices set in the morning as appropriate for each case. The results are shown in
Table 4.
In addition to showing that new customer prices increase less than one to one with the rival’s
loyalty price, the results for case 3 in Table 4 indicate that people who set high prices for loyal
customers also set high prices for new afternoon customers even though their own loyalty price
should not matter. Subjects also appear to falsely believe that rivals who set high morning prices
15

Table 4: Afternoon Pricing Behavior as a Function of Prices Set in the Morning
Case
Buyer
Preferences
Price
Pre-commitment
Estimated
Equation
Constant
Predicted
Observed
p-value
Predicted
Observed
p-value
Predicted
Observed
p-value
Predicted
Observed

1-Baseline
Independent

2
Fixed

3
Independent

4
Fixed

No

No

Yes

Yes

from (1)

from (1)

from (2a)

from (2b)

from (3)

from (4)

170
170
61.517*** 47.860**
(18.714) (19.022)
<0.001
<0.001

90
30.158
(21.335)
0.0050

130
13.287***
(2.394)
<0.001

85
22.635***
(4.445)
<0.001

25
15.652
(14.939)
0.5315

0
0.157***
(0.053)
0.0029

0
0.270**
(0.108)
0.0122

0.5
0.334***
(0.072)
0.0207

-0.25
0.601***
(0.029)
<0.001

0
0.177
(0.149)
0.2341

0.5
0.072
(0.075)
<0.001

0
0.232***
(0.041)
<0.001

0
0.238***
(0.031)
<0.001

-0.5
0.273***
(0.096)
<0.001

0.25
0.238***
(0.042)
0.7676

0
0.152*
(0.078)
0.0509

-0.5
0.107
(0.066)
<0.001

-

-

-

-

0
0.207**
(0.094)
0.0276

0.25
0.338***
(0.063)
0.1674

-

-

-

-

.5
0.175***
(0.035)
<0.001

0.25
0.203***
(0.028)
0.0906

p-value
Predicted
Observed
p-value

Note: Standard errors clustered at the session level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. P-values are for testing the null hypothesis that the observed behavior is
equal to the predicted value against the two sided null hypotheses.

are likely to set high afternoon prices for new customers and respond with higher prices. This
belief is also found in the other cases as well, although it is justified in cases 1 and 2 as a higher
16

morning price does lead to higher afternoon prices. For case 2, this can explain why subjects are
raising their prices when they should be lowering them. Although a higher morning price by
one’s rival pushes

∗

away and thus calls for a lower price than in equilibrium, this predicted

response is assuming that the rival will behave optimally in stage 2. If a rival that charges too
high a price in the morning will also charge too high of a price in the afternoon then it makes
sense not to lower one’s own price relative to the equilibrium.
We return to session level analysis to ask how the treatment variables impact price levels. To do
this, we estimate

, where

1, 64 is a subject;

1, 20 is a day;

~

0,

and

is a price;

1,16 is a session.

is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is from a session where buyer
preferences are stable and is 0 otherwise.

is an indicator variable that takes

the value 1 if the observation is from a session where price pre-commitment is possible and is 0
otherwise. The regression results are presented in Table 5 with standard errors clustered at the
session level. Based on the evidence in Table 5, it appears that price levels are driven by the
ability to pre-commit to prices for loyal customers and not the variability in customer
preferences. Specifically, the ability to pre-commit leads to lower prices in the morning, lower
prices for new customers in the afternoon and for loyal customers in the afternoon.
Table 5: Impact of Market Characteristics on Prices, Sellers Profit and Total Consumer Costs
Morning
Price

Preference
Stability
Price
Commitment
Constant

Observations

Price for Loyal Price for New
Customers
Customers

Sellers Profit

Total
Consumer
Costs

-12.223
(8.134)

2.186
(7.691)

-10.036
(6.951)

-317.9196
(946.083)

-1139.76
(0.507)

-17.077**
(8.134)

-27.367***
(7.691)

-19.648***
(6.951)

-2475.61**
(932.170)

-4451.95**
(0.009)

145.954***
(7.364)

123.351***
(9.47)

120.326***
(7.511)

9497.779***
(883.226)

38619.31***
(<0.001)

1280

1280

1280

1280

640

Note: Standard error in parentheses. ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 5 also reports how the treatment variables impact seller profits and consumer costs. It is
important to note that profit and costs do not need to move with prices since customers
experience incur travel costs and prices affect market share. The results in Table 5 reveal that
pre-commitment significantly lowers seller profit and it is also detrimental to shoppers. The later
result is intuitive in that sellers can exploit the better information about shoppers in the afternoon
when preferences are fixed, while the former result is less intuitive but driven by the overall
lower price level.
Figure 3 shows morning and afternoon profit for each case. Across all conditions, a majority of
seller profit is achieved in the morning. Without price pre-commitment, sellers are able to
extract relatively large afternoon profits when they know the preferences of shoppers. The figure
also shows that the lower profits with price pre-commitment are driven by reductions in
afternoon profits, when both repeat and new customer prices are low. Further, the lost profit
from the competitive pressure of pre-commitment more than offsets the benefit of knowing the
preferences of shoppers.
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Figure 3: Comparison of Morning and Afternoon Profit (means) by Case

Note: Dash lines represent values predicted by the model.

Figure 4 plots consumer costs in the morning and the afternoon for each case. The figure clearly
shows that in total cost to consumers in the morning is similar in cases 1, 2, and 3, but is lower in
case 4. The graph also shows that afternoon consumer costs are lower when sellers have price
pre-commitment (cases 3 and 4) then when sellers cannot (cases 1 and 2). However, the stability
of consumer preferences has the opposite impact from what was expected. In cases without price
pre-commitment (cases 1 and 2), fixed consumer preferences increase total consumer costs in the
afternoon, while in cases where sellers can engage in price pre-commit for repeated buyers
(cases 3 and 4) total consumer costs increase when buyer preferences are not fixed.
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Figure 4: Comparison of Morning and Afternoon Total Customer Costs (means) by Case

Note: Dash lines represent values predicted by the model.

Finally, we compare how similar observed profits and total consumer costs are to their predicted
levels for each treatment. To do this, we conduct the following analysis:
, where

denotes the difference between the observed

and predicted level of the specific welfare measure where

is an indicator variable that

takes the value 1 if the observation is from Case j and is 0 otherwise. The results, show in
Table 6, indicate that for three of the cases seller profits and total consumer costs are well below
the predicted levels. However, in Case 3 profits and consumer costs are similar to the predicted
levels. In Cases 1, 2, and 4 sellers are observed to be engaging in strong competition, which is
pushing prices down harming profits to the benefit of consumers. However, when shopper
preferences are not fixed and price pre-commitment is possible sellers are unwilling to price
below costs and fully exploit loyalty pricing. This has the effect of weakening competitive
pressure and increasing profits in exactly the case where profits were predicted to be the lowest.
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Table 6: Comparison of Observed and Predicted Welfare Measures
Analysis of Seller Profit
Regression

<0.001
p-value for Ho: i=0
Test Observed = Predicted
Case 1
Ho:
1=0
p-value
<0.001
Analysis of Total Consumer Cost
Regression

<0.001
p-value for Ho: i=0
Test Observed = Predicted
Case 1
Ho:
1=0
p-value
<0.001


0.087
Case 2
1+2=0
<0.001


<0.001
Case 3
1+3=0
0.6836


0.373
Case 4
1+4=0
<0.001


0.451
Case 2
1+2=0
<0.001


0.003
Case 3
1+3=0
0.2887


0.565
Case 4
1+4=0
<0.001

Note: Dependent variable is Observed Value – Predicted Value. Analysis is done at the individual level for profit
and at the market level for consumer cost. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

Conclusions
This paper reports an experimental investigation of behavior based pricing for competing
duopolists who can charge different prices to buyers with different purchase histories. The
setting closely follows the theoretical model developed by Chen and Pearcy (2010) in
considering the effect of changes in buyer preferences and the ability of sellers to pre-commit to
prices for repeat buyers when the sellers offer differentiated products to a continuum of
shoppers. Specifically, we conducted a series of controlled laboratory experiments varying these
two factors resulting in four distinct market cases. In the markets, seller set three different prices
– a morning price, an afternoon price for loyal customers and an afternoon price to poach
customers who visited the rival seller in the morning.
The results of our experimental study generally support the comparative static results of the
theoretical model, although the point predictions typically do not. In general, there is less
difference between prices in different treatments than predicted. Morning prices are higher than
afternoon prices as predicted in most cases, although morning prices are also higher in the
baseline where this change is not predicted. When buyer preferences are not stable over time
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and sellers cannot make price pre-commitments, sellers should not differentiate between new and
repeat customers and on average they do not. Fixing customer preferences over time should lead
to seller’s exploiting repeat customers and poaching new customers from rivals and this is what
we observe. Allowing price pre-commitment for repeat shoppers when buyer preferences are
independent over time should lead to loyalty discounts being offered. Loyalty discounts are
more likely to be observed in this case, but the size of the discounts does not match the
theoretical prediction. This appears to be due in part to the fact that the predicted loyalty
discounts actually involve pricing below cost, something the subject sellers were reluctant to do
although it is far more common in this case than in any of the others. The results also indicate
that subject sellers are basing their prices on information that is not relevant in equilibrium.
However, if out of equilibrium behavior is taken as a signal of future pricing then this response
could be optimal. For example, if one believes that a seller who sets a relatively high price in the
morning will also overprice later in the day, then increasing one’s own afternoon prices could be
reasonable. Another interesting finding is that the ability to pre-commit to prices has a greater
impact on price levels than the intertemporal relationship among buyer preferences. In
particular, the use of price pre-commitments lead to lower prices and thus lower profits for seller
indicating that the practice may be something seller want to avoid.
As technology continues to enable more tailored pricing and shopping experiences in general, it
is increasingly important to understand how practices such as behavior based pricing will impact
market outcomes. While there has been some work on this issue form a theoretical perspective,
there has been relatively little empirical study. In part this may be driven by important aspects of
the problem, such as the stability of buyer preferences, being unobservable in the field. We use
the laboratory to overcome this problem and believe this is a fruitful avenue for investigating
behavior based pricing. This is not to argue that lab experiments should be viewed as a
substitute for field work. Rather, the two approaches are complements as laboratory studies
necessarily reduce the complexity and richness of the decision problem. One specific aspect of
the behavior based pricing practice that we believe merits future investigation is in identifying
how buyers react to the differential pricing. Our results are based on the assumption that buyers
are both forward looking and profit maximizing. Such assumptions are appropriate when
evaluating theoretical models where this assumption is maintained as was our goal. However,
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the assumption that buyers will maximize their profits when making a second purchase and thus
truthfully reveal their preferences at that point may or may not be valid. It might be a reasonable
assumption when buyers have little market power, but it is easy to imagine a returning customer
becoming upset about being charged more than a new customer and as result switch sellers even
if it means paying more.
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Appendix A. Subject Directions and Comprehension Handout
[Text in brackets was not observed by the subjects.]

Experiment Instructions
In this experiment, you will be paid based in part upon your decisions. Therefore, it is important
that you understand the instructions completely. If you have any questions, please raise your
hand and someone will come to your desk.
What am I doing in this Experiment? You are a seller.
In today’s experiment you will be in the role of a seller. You can think of yourself as running an
ice cream shop at a beach that is 120 yards long. Your shop is located at one end of the beach.
Someone else is running an ice cream shop at the other end of the beach. Every “day” new
people come to visit the beach and sit under their umbrellas, which are located evenly and
continuously all along the length of the beach.
Everyone at the beach wants to buy ice cream twice, once in the morning and once in the
afternoon. You and the other seller will each set your own price for ice cream. When deciding
where to buy their ice cream, the people on the beach look at both the price that is being charged
and the distance in yards they have to travel to reach the shop.
Cost to Customer = Price + Distance to Shop
you

Distance = X
0

Distance = 120 ‐ X
X

120

For example, suppose you set a price of 140 and the other seller set a price of 160
A customer located at X = 50 yards from you and hence 70 = 120  50 yards from the other
seller
would incur a cost of 190 = 140 + 50 to buy from you.
would incur a cost of 230 = 160 + 70 to buy from the other seller.
A customer located X= 80 yards from you and hence 40 = 120  80 yards from the other seller
would incur a cost of 220 = 140 + 80 to buy from you.
would incur a cost of 200 = 160 + 40 to buy from the other seller.
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[CASE 1]
At the start of the day you and the other seller will each set your morning price.
While the people at the beach go to lunch, you can set your afternoon prices. You can set
different prices for people who bought ice cream from you in the morning and for people who
bought ice cream from the other seller in the morning. The other seller also sets afternoon prices
for repeat customers and for new customers who bought ice cream from you in the morning.
After lunch people randomly choose a new location on the beach so where they were in the
morning does not tell you anything about where they will be in the afternoon.
[CASE 2]
At the start of the day you and the other seller will each set your morning price.
While the people at the beach go to lunch, you can set your afternoon prices. You can set
different prices for people who bought ice cream from you in the morning and for people who
bought ice cream from the other seller in the morning. The other seller also sets afternoon prices
for repeat customers and for new customers who bought ice cream from you in the morning.
After lunch people come back to the exact same place on the beach they were before lunch.
[CASE 3]
At the start of the day you and the other seller will each set your morning price. At the start of
the day you and the other seller will also set your price for a second serving, the price at which a
repeat customer can come back in the afternoon and pay for ice cream.
While the people at the beach go to lunch, you can set your price for customers who did not buy
ice cream from you in the morning (that is your price for the people who bought ice cream from
the other seller in the morning). The price that you charge these new customers can be more
than, less than or equal to the price you charge repeat customers. The other seller also sets an
afternoon price for new customers that bought ice cream from you in the morning.
After lunch people randomly choose a new location on the beach, so where they were in the
morning does not tell you anything about where they will be in the afternoon.
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[CASE 4]
At the start of the day you and the other seller will each set your morning price. At the start of
the day you and the other seller will also set your price for a second serving, the price at which a
repeat customer can come back in the afternoon and pay for ice cream.
While the people at the beach go to lunch, you can set your afternoon price for customers who
did not buy ice cream from you in the morning (that is your price for the people who bought ice
cream from the other seller in the morning). The price that you charge these new customers can
be more than, less than or equal to the price you charge repeat customers. The other seller also
sets an afternoon price for new customers that bought ice cream from you in the morning.
After lunch people come back to the exact same place on the beach they were before lunch.
[END CASES]
If I am selling, who is buying? Buyers are automated by the computer.
In the afternoon, the computerized buyers simply look at the prices (the repeat customer price of
the seller visited in the morning and new customer price of the seller not visited) and purchase
from whichever seller offers the best deal (lowest sum of price + distance).
For those who bought from you in the morning, based on your price for a repeat customer and
the other seller’s price for new customers, there will be a cutoff point on the beach and everyone
who bought from you in the morning and is now closer to you than that cutoff will buy ice cream
from you at your repeat customer price. The rest will buy from the other seller. Similarly, for
those who bought from the other seller in the morning, based on your price for a new customer
and the other seller’s price for a repeat customer, there will be a cutoff point on the beach and
everyone who bought from the other seller in the morning and is now closer to you than that
cutoff will buy ice cream from you at your new customer price. The rest will buy from the other
seller.
In the morning, the computerized buyers look at the current prices, their current location, and
what they anticipate will happen in the afternoon. The buyers anticipate that both sellers will
choose prices optimally in the afternoon given what happens in the morning. Computerized
buyers then determine where to go in the morning so as to minimize their expected total cost for
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their morning plus afternoon purchases. This does not mean that buyers will visit the same seller
in the morning and the afternoon. Depending on the prices and their locations different buyers
may anticipate visiting the same seller twice or each seller once. Again, the result of this buyer
behavior is that there will be a cutoff point on the beach in the morning based upon the prices
that have been set. Everyone closer to you than this cutoff point will buy from you at your
morning price. Everyone further away than this point will buy from the other seller in the
morning.
[CASES 1 & 3]
For example, suppose that in the morning, everyone up to the cutoff of 70 comes to your shop. If
you set a price of 180 for repeat customers and the other shop set a price of 150 for new
customers, then in the afternoon a person located at 45 who had come to you in the morning
would have a cost of 225 (price + distance) from each seller. Everyone who visited you in the
morning and was now located closer to you than 45 would come to you as a repeat customer in
the afternoon. Everyone now located between 45 and 120 who had visited you in the morning
would visit the other seller as a new customer in the afternoon. People that were further away
from you than 70 in the morning visited the other seller in the morning and thus would be
comparing your new customer price and the other seller’s repeat customer price and there would
be some cutoff for those people as well.
People who visit you in the morning
can be anywhere in afternoon

you

Repeat
at 180

0

New
at 150

45

120

People who visit the other seller in the morning
can be anywhere in the afternoon
you

New

Repeat

0

120
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[CASES 2 & 4]
For example, suppose that in the morning, everyone up to the cutoff of 70 comes to your shop. If
you set a price of 180 for repeat customers and the other shop set a price of 150 for new
customers, then in the afternoon a person located at 45 would have a cost of 225 (price +
distance) from each seller. Everyone located closer to you than 45 would come to you as a
repeat customer in the afternoon. Everyone located between 45 and 70 would visit the other
seller as a new customer in the afternoon. People that are further away from you than 70 visited
the other seller in the morning and thus would be comparing your new customer price and the
other seller’s repeat customer price and there would be some cutoff for those people as well.
Buy from Other
Seller in the
morning

Buy from You
in the morning
you

Repeat
at 180

0

New

New
at 150

45

70

Repeat

120

[End CASES]
The right hand portion of your screen will show you what happens each day. There will be three
bars representing the beach: a morning bar, an afternoon bar for those that visited you in the
morning, and an afternoon bar for those that visited the other seller in the morning. The bars
will be color coded with your prices and customer locations in green and the other seller’s prices
and customer locations in orange.
How much am I paid? You are paid based on your profit.
Each unit of ice cream that you sell costs you 50. The other seller also has a cost of 50 per unit.
Your profit for the day is the sum of three parts:
Morning Profit = (Morning Price – Cost of 50) × Number of Morning Customers
Repeat Customer Profit = (Repeat Customer Price – Cost of 50) × Number of Repeat Customers
New Customer Profit = (New Customer Price – Cost of 50) × Number of New Customers
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[CASES 1 & 3]
There is one customer per yard. So the number of morning customers that you serve is equal to
the morning cutoff point. Your repeat customers in the afternoon include everyone who bought
from you in the morning and is now closer to you than the cutoff for your repeat customers in the
afternoon. Thus your number of repeat customers is calculated as the repeat customer cutoff ×
the fraction of the buyers who visit you in the morning. This fraction equals the morning cutoff
÷ 120. Your new customers in the afternoon include everyone who did not buy from you in the
morning and is now closer to you than the cutoff for your new customers in the afternoon. Thus
your number of new customers is calculated as the new customer cutoff × the fraction of the
buyers who did not visit you in the morning. This fraction equals the (120 – morning cutoff) ÷
120.
[CASES 2 & 4]
There is one customer per yard. So the number of morning customers that you serve is equal to
the morning cutoff point. Your repeat customers in the afternoon include everyone who bought
from you in the morning and is closer to you than the cutoff for your repeat customers in the
afternoon. Thus your number of repeat customers is calculated as the repeat customer cutoff.
Your new customers in the afternoon include everyone who did not buy from you in the morning
and is closer to you than the cutoff for your new customers in the afternoon. Thus your number
of new customers is calculated as the new customer cutoff – morning cutoff.
[End CASES]
The experiment lasts for several days, but neither you nor anyone else in the experiment knows
how many. After each day, the table on your screen will be updated so you have a record of the
day’s prices, the number of morning, new and repeat customers you served, and your profit.
Your profit for the experiment is your cumulative earnings from each day. All the monetary
amounts in the experiment are in lab dollars. At the end of the experiment your lab dollar
earnings will be converted to $US at the rate 2500 Lab Dollars = $0.10 and this is the amount
that you will be paid in cash (in addition to the $5 you are receiving for participating).
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Each day the customers are new, so they do not know what prices were charged on previous days
nor do they care what prices will be charged on future days.
The person in the experiment making decisions for the other ice cream shop in your market is
randomly determined at the beginning of each and every day. Further, no one will ever know the
identity of the other seller in the market at any point.
When you are done reading the instructions, raise your hand.
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Appendix B. Review Questions
The following questions are designed to ensure that everyone understands the experiment before
we begin. Your answers will not impact your payoff in any way and you should feel free to ask
questions at any point. Once you are done answering the questions, please raise your hand so
that an experimenter can verify your answers.
Question 1. Suppose that in the morning, you served customers up to the cutoff 80 yards away
from you (so the other 40 customers went to the other seller). If your price for repeat customers
is 170 and the other seller’s price for new customers is 110, how many repeat customers will you
have that afternoon? __________
Question 2. Suppose that you set the following prices:
Your Morning Price = 150
Your Afternoon Price for Repeat Customers = 150
Your Afternoon Price for New Customers = 100
If you have 60 customers in the morning, 30 repeat customers in the afternoon, and 40 new
customers in the afternoon, then your profit would be ________
Question 3. You have to charge the same price to repeat and new customers.
True or False
Question 4. In the morning, you will set your price for (afternoon) repeat customers.
True or False
Question 5. In the morning, you will set your price for (afternoon) new customers.
True or False
Question 6. If a customer was close to you in the morning then in the afternoon that customer
a. will be close to you as customers are in the same place in the morning and afternoon.
b. could be anywhere as customer’s locations are randomly picked in the afternoon.
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